









T H E  
Present Ruinous  
**LAND-WAR,**  
Proved to be a  
**H—r WAR,**  
B Y  
FACTS as well as ARGUMENTS;  
OR THE  
OPPOSITION fully Vindicated.

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By a LOVER of his COUNTRY.

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*Vincit Amor Patriæ* —————

*Si Natura negat, facit Indignatio Versum.*

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L O N D O N:

Printed for M. COOPER, in Pater-noster-row,  
M D C C X L V.

[Price One Shilling.]





T H E  
**Present Ruinous  
 LAND-WAR,  
 Proved to be a  
 H——r WAR, &c.**

July 1812  
MS. A. 1. 12

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 T is a very melancholy and shocking Consideration, but, to our inexpressible Misfortune, it is strictly true, that the People of Great Britain need only seriously consult their own Interest, and heartily pursue it, to become the happiest and most powerful Nation in Europe: And what renders this more deplorable, and more shocking is, that though scarce any People in the World are better acquainted with their true Interest, never any pursued it less; What did we say, pursued it less! never any ran so diametrically counter thereto. The late witty Earl of Rochester, in one of his Poems on a miserable

Poetaster, has this Observation of him.

" As *skilful Divers* to the *Bottom fall,*  
 " *Sooner than those* who *cannot dive at all;*  
 " *So in this Way of writing, without thinking,*  
 " *Thou hast a strange Alacrity in sinking.*

And sure we are *Mutatis Mutandis*, never was this Observation more *truly verified*, than it has been, of late Years, by *these unhappy Kingdoms*; never did any People *act so inconsiderately*, and *without Thought*; never did any *run so headlong*, upon *certain and inevitable Perdition*.

It *never was, never will, nor indeed never can be*, the *real Interest of Great Britain*, to *engage at all in a Land-War*; and more especially, not *as Principals*. It is *manifest Ruin and Destruction*; it is *running down a Precipice with our Eyes open*; it is *plunging deliberately into a bottomless Abyss*, from whence there is *no Return*; it is *launching into a boundless Ocean without Provision, Stores, or Men*; in short, it is *intangling ourselves within the Vortex of an all-devouring Whirlpool*, which must necessarily *AT ONCE ruin our Commerce, and exhaust us of our most useful Hands and Money*; and all this, without the *least probable Prospect*, of *one single Advantage to the Publick*. We say to the *Publick*; for, that it will be *sufficiently beneficial to some private Purse*, we do not *at all doubt*.

But, perhaps, we may be told, this Representation

sentation of Things is *Outre le Tableau*; exceeding all Bounds; and inflaming the Reckoning: We deny it; bad as this Picture is, it is drawn too much to the Life, as we shall find too soon, by dear bought Experience, if we persist to go on, in the same desperate and destructive Track. For *Great Britain* to engage in a *Land-War*, is to the full as preposterous, as it would be in the Kings of *Poland* or *Pru-sia*, to aim at fitting out a formidable Fleet, and engage in a *Sea-Fight*, with the *Maritime Powers*.

The former of these Monarchs has Dominions bordering upon those of our Sovereign, as Elector of *Hanover*; and the latter, has Territories adjoining both to those of that Electorate, and the *States General*; now, supposing this Contiguity of their Dominions, shou'd occasion any Difference between those several Powers, which could not be accommodated by Way of Negotiation; is it to be imagined, that either of those Princes, wou'd be so wrong-headed, so blind to his own Interest, to forego his natural Strength, and attempt fitting out a naval Armament, in order to bring their Enemies to Reason? No Man living can believe they would act so *ridiculously*; and yet even this would be as *prudent* and *judicious*, as it is for us to engage in a War by *Land*.

In such a Case we are as much out of our Element, as a Fish out of the Water; the *Sea* is our *proper Sphere of Action*, and to that we

ought to *confine all our Efforts*, whether with Intent to *assist our Allies*, or to *annoy our Enemies*; this we *ought to do* if we were *wise*; and this we *shou'd do*, if the Motives, to our embarking in this War, were *entirely British*. The stale *Pretences* of preserving the *Ballance of Europe*; of supporting the Queen of *Hungary*; and of reducing the *exorbitant Power of France*, are now clearly seen through, by every intelligent and impartial Person in the three Kingdoms; and known to be but *mere Pretences*, to *disguise and cover other Designs, not fit to be openly avowed*.

In Effect, had *our Zeal*, for the *Preservation of the Ballance of Power*, been *as real*, as it is now *pretended*, how are we to account for our *intolerable Indolence, Supineness and Inactivity*, in 1734, when we suffer'd the late Emperor *Charles VI.* to be *over-run*, and *deprived* of all his Dominions in *Italy*, besides the *irreparable Loss* of all his *Veteran Troops*, without stirring a Finger to *help him*; though we might then have *done it effectually*, for one fourth of the *Expence*, it has since cost us on that *Pretence*? If, indeed, *our Zeal* for this *Measure* was really *so extraordinary*, as is now *pretended*: Where was it, even before that Time, when we, in a Manner, compell'd that unfortunate Prince, to submit to the *Introduction*, of *Six Thousand Spanish Troops* into *Tuscany*, and even carried them in *Triumph* thither, notwithstanding his *earnest Remonstrances*,

*strances, Intreaties,* and even arming to oppose it ; because he plainly foresaw, (as indeed did every Man of common Sense besides,) what *blessed Effects* it would have ? Where was it, still before that, when we join'd in an Alliance with *France*, against the House of *Austria* ?

But, perhaps, we may be ask'd, what is this to any Man now living ? We acknowledge the Conduct of that Minister to have been *fundamentally wrong*, but he had the *supreme Direction of Affairs*, and who could help it ? We shall see that presently. Were not every one of these *destructive Measures APPROV'D* in P——t, even though the fatal *Consequences*, that would result from thence, were *expressly foretold* ? And could it have been possible, for this wicked, weak, and corrupt Minister, (who is now gone to answer for all his *Treasons* before a *Tribunal* he can neither corrupt, elude, nor escape,) to have supported himself so long in *Power*, without this their SANCTION and APPROBATION ?

And yet, were not many, of the most zealous Adopters of the contrary Measures lately, the most zealous Espousers of those ruinous Measures, at that Time ? What shall we say to such *inconsistent Conduct* ! What powerful Eye-Salve, have these Gentlemen had lately to enlighten them ! But even this is not all : were not many of these Gentlemen the very Persons, who effectually skreen'd the Author of all this *Mischief*, from condign Punishment ; and thereby made

made themselves (as they may *find one Day,* unless they repent, *to their Cost*) the *Partakers* and *Accomplices* of his *Guilt* ?

If this is the *real Case*, and we defy the most hardened in Iniquity to deny that it is so, can any Man in his Senses believe, that 't... pretended Zeal, on a sudden, for *restorin:* *Ballance of Europe*, which we had fatigably, and, to our *Shame* b... too successfully, endeavour'd Years, to overturn, subvert, .. sincere and in earnest? Was it at we shou'd undo, at one *Stroke*, w... been so long industriously labouring to c... the contrary, must they not plainly see, only a Cloak, to cover some detestable Design, too scandalous to be avow'd? What that Design might probably be, we may, perhaps, see in the Sequel. We may then likewise see, the Evidence of supporting the Queen of Hungary, and reducing the Power of France, was equally insincere, and only a Mask, for some unwarrantable Scheme, or some iniquitous Job, too shameful to be brought to Light.

In short, it is a *most mistaken and amazing Policy*, which wou'd involve Great-Britain in a *War by Land*, on Account of any Quarrels of our Neighbours on the Continent; it is a very disputable Point, whether we ought to engage, in any *War at all*, on their Behalf; since it is very certain, whilst the *true Interest* of these Kingdoms is pursued, which will of Course make

make us *an united People*, let the Issue be as it will, the *conquering Power* (whatever *artful* and *designing Men* may pretend) can never hurt *Great-Britain*, whilst she continues *Mistress of the Sea*; on the contrary, it is evident, she has the *best Opportunity* in the World, of *increasing and extending her Commerce*, whilst her Neighbours are involv'd in a War, and worrying each other.

This is a Piece of *sound Policy*, whereof our *prudent Neighbours* the *Dutch* are *well appriz'd*, and which they have hitherto had *sufficient good Sense* to put in Practice; wou'd to Heaven, we had been *wise enough*, to *follow their Example!*

Thus far we have thought fit to premise, in general, by Way of Introduction, proceed we now to shew more particularly, not only that the present *ruinous Land War*, was not begun, upon any Motives that were truly *British*, but that it arose from Views, altogether different from what was pretended, namely, to promote the Advantage of certain foreign Dominions. This we hope to prove, as plainly as the Nature of the Thing will admit, *first*, by shewing that it never can be the *true Interest* of these Kingdoms, to engage in such a War; and *secondly*, by demonstrating from the Manner in which it has been carried on, that neither the Interest of the Queen of *Hungary*, or any of our Allies has been consulted, nor yet the Reduction

duction of the Power of *France* prosecuted, with any Vigour whatever.

*First*, then, that it can never be *our real Interest*, to embark in a *Land-War*, most evidently appears, because as we are *Islanders*, and indisputably the *greatest Maritime Power*, and the *greatest Trading Nation*, in the known World, our *natural and principal Strength* must necessarily lye in our *Naval Armaments*; from whence it consequently follows, that, unless we are as *blind as Moles*, and as *wrong-headed* as Sir *Martin Mar-all*, unless we have a Mind to give our Enemies a *visible Advantage* over us, which none would do but *Ideots*, and none wou'd advise but *Tr——rs*, we ought to confine all our Efforts to the *Sea*, which, in reality, may almost as properly be call'd *our Element*, on such Occasions, as it may *that of the Fish*.

If then we are desirous, of prosecuting a War in such a Manner, as may be *most advantagious* to ourselves, and *most prejudicial* and *most destructive* to our Foes; in such a Manner as may soonest *reduce them to Reason*; *restore our almost ruin'd Trade*; *retrieve our sinking Manufactures*; and procure us a *safe, honourable, and lasting Peace*: it must be by a *vigorous Exertion* of our Strength upon the Main; which alone can effect all these; and will do more, if properly conducted, towards *re-establishing the Balance of Power*, and *tumbling the haughty French*.

*French Monarch* and the *Fury of Spain*, in *three Years*, than all our Efforts by *Land*, even if *successful*, which is *scarce* to be *hoped*, much less *expected*, will be able to accomplish in *ten*.

Another Reason, and a *weighty one* too, why, we ought never to engage in a *Land-War*, upon any Consideration whatever, is, because it *drains us most of our most useful Hands and Money*; and consequently *must impoverish* and *ruin us* the *soonest*. In a *Land-War*, *prodigious Sums* must be annually remitted Abroad, for the *Pay and Subsistence* of our Troops, very little of which, if any, ever returns again to these Kingdoms; whereas in a *Sea-War* almost all the Money is spent and circulates among ourselves, insomuch that the Nation in general is *very little impoverished* thereby; and, were it not that it lays our *foreign Trade* under *some Difficulties*, by obliging our Merchant Ships to wait for *Convoys*, and *exposing them to the Danger* of being taken by the Enemy, we might bear it for numberless Years, without any *considerable Inconvenience*.

In Effect, it is *notorious* that a *Land-War impoverishes* us more in one Year, than a Naval one cou'd possibly do in *three*; and that, by our *hopeful Management* of the *present War*, it has already cost us more, without being of the *least Advantage* to *ourselves*, or any of our *Allies*, than it would have done, had it been carried on only by Sea, in *ten Years*; nay,

even our *last* shameful and never to be forgotten Campaign, where, to our eternal Reproach, we were forced to *skulk* behind our *Intrenchments*, whilst the Enemy were taking Town after Town, *in our Sight*, and *under our very Noses*, was of more Expence to these *unhappy Kingdoms*, than, had it been well employ'd, and prudently directed, would have secured us Footing in the Spanish *West-Indies*, and prevented the Return of those immense Treasures, without which *Spain* could not have carried on the War one Campaign longer; nor could *France* have kept *Bavaria*, the *Elector Palatine*, or even *Sweden* in her Alliance; in which Case, *Prussia* must have been glad to have comply'd, almost at any Rate.

Again, another Circumstance, which makes a *Land-War* infinitely *more ruinous* to us, than one by *Sea*, is, that it exhausts us more, as was before observ'd, of our *most useful Hands*, we mean, our *able bodied Men*. In a *Sea Engagement*, let it be ever so bloody, the Loss of Men seldom or never amounts to more than *two* or *three thousand*, which it will be always in our Power to *recruit*, without any *great Inconvenience*, for some Years; but in the *Land Service*, it is quite the contrary; Skirmishes there are happening every Day, wherein, tho' they should not come to a pitch'd Battle, many thousands are lost; not to mention *Desertion*, and *Sickness* through over *Fatigue*, and being forced to incamp in *unwholesome Stations*.

Of this we have lately had two remarkable Instances, in the Armies of *France*, and *Prussia*; which, without coming to any set Engagement, were each of them almost half cut off, in one Winter; insomuch that neither lost so few as twenty thousand Men; and at the single Battle of *Malplaquet*, the Allies themselves though Conquerors, lost as many Thousands, besides those who died afterwards of their Wounds; such is the *Havock* and *Desolation* that is occasioned by a *Land-War*, even when successful! And, shall we though *Islanders*, and a *Maritime Power*, still preposterously continue, to expose ourselves to such a dreadful Calamity!

How long, and severely, did the poor *Swedes* smart for this *Folly* in their *obstinate* and *self-will'd* Monarch, the late *Charles XII.* who though he met with *uninterrupted Success*, for many Years together, and constantly drove all his Enemies before him, till the Battle of *Pultowa*, had so *effectually exhausted* his Country, of all the *most useful* Hands, that, upon his receiving that *one single Defeat*, he was *irrecoverably ruined*; and his Kingdom was so much drained, that for want of *Men* to perform all those *laborious Offices*, for which the *most robust* alone are proper, the *very Women* were obliged to *till the Ground*, *drive the Carriages*, and *ply in the Boats* upon their Rivers; insomuch that it is much to be question'd, whether they have yet recover'd, the Ruin then brought

upon them, by that *misguided* and *unfortunate* though *truly heroick* Prince.

What a lively Picture, of the *most consummate Misery*, was *unhappy Sweden*, at that Time! And what an *useful* and *instructive Lesson*, for all succeeding Monarchs, might be drawn, from the *Misfortunes* of that *ill-fated King*, not to plunge their People into such *almost irretrievable Disasters*, either to gratify their *Ambition*, *Avarice*, or any other *darling* and *unwarrantable Passion*!

It is a prudent and salutary Maxim with us *Britons*, that our Sovereigns *can do no wrong*; if therefore any *preposterous Measures* are pursued, and *obstinately persisted in*, even after *woful Experience* has shown them to be *fundamentally wrong*, the Advisers of them are *responsible* for all the *bad Consequences* that result from thence; neither will it at all avail them, if call'd to an Account before a *truly British Parliament*, to plead they did so, in Compliance with any *favourite Views* of the Prince for the Time being; it was not in the least doubted then, nor is it at present, that the *unfortunate Earl of Strafford*, consulted the *Inclination* and *Passions* of his unhappy Master, which were to render himself absolute (a *Passion*, that *prevails but too much* in most Princes!) when he propos'd sending for an Army from *Ireland*, to awe the Parliament; and yet, though there was then no Law, that *no Pardon under the Great Seal*, should be *pleadable* against an *Impeachment* by the

the *Commons*; Nay, though there was no express Law, to make his Crimes *Treason*, King *Charles*, notwithstanding he struggled hard for it, found it impossible to save him, and was forced to give him up.

That the *precipitating us into a Land-War*, was a Measure fundamentally *wrong*, will not be denied, we believe, by any *true Briton*; and should ever *an Enquiry* be made, into the Motives that occasioned it, we dare say, they will be found not to have been *British*; to persist in it, therefore, any longer, than till we can get well out of it, would be *yet worse*; not but we approve of *treating Sword in Hand*; and would *not advise* leaving our *Allies* in the Lurch, now that we have drawn the *French Armies* into *Flanders*, as we did last Year, by our *preposterous Conduct*; and as it was foretold we should.

All we wou'd infer from hence is, if the *Dutch* will not come into the Alliance *heartily*, and *totis Viribus*; if, by *temporizing*, they can provide for the *Security* of their *Barrier*, and of the *Netherlands*; it will be *absolutely necessary* for us, to *desist* from our *military Operations* by *Land*, and convert our intended Assistance of the *Queen of Hungary* into a *pecuniary Aid*; (which will be of *infinitely more Service* to her, and of *infinitely less Detriment* to ourselves,) whilst we make our *utmost Efforts* by *Sea*, the *only probable Way*, of bringing our *haughty* and *perfidious Enemies* to *Reason*.

In

In Effect, what Advantage can we ever propose to ourselves by carrying on a *Land-War*; and especially in *Flanders*, where the *French* are well known to be the *strongest*, and *almost invulnerable*? The late Duke of Schomberg, who was an able *Politician*, as well as a *Great General*, used to say, That to *attack* the *French* in *Flanders*, was like *taking a Bull by the Horns*; meaning thereby that there was as little Hopes of *overcoming the former* one Way, as of *subduing the latter* the other; and indeed the Experience of *Queen Anne's War*, when they supported a ten Years War; under one *uninterrupted Series*, of *astonishing Losses* and *Defeats*, is a *convincing Proof* his Grace was not much mistaken.

It is *an old*, and generally *a true* Saying, that *Experience makes even Fools wise*; but, to our Sorrow and Shame be it spoken, not the most *woful Experience* can make us so: The Proverb says, *The BURN'T CHILD DREADS the Fire*; but we are *such Children*, that *no Burning* can *make us dread it*; the Moment it is *over*, nay, before the Smart is *quite gone off*; before our *Wounds* are *half healed*, we are *running our Fingers into it again*.

If the *French* were able to support such a Series of *amazing Disasters*, for *so long*, even though a *severe Famine* had likewise added to their Calamities; and all this against two such Generals as Prince *Eugene*, and the Duke of *Marlborcugh*, that is, (without Disparagement to

to the Merits of the gallant Prince *Charles of Lorrain*, or the *intrepid young Hero*, who is now named to command our Forces,) against two of the *greatest Commanders* many Ages have afforded; if the *French* were able to do this, we say, and at the last, were so little *weaken'd*, that upon the Cessation of Arms, and Separation of only the *British* National Forces, they carried all before them, and recovered *more* in one Campaign than they had *lost* in three; would any *Briton*, who is not a *downright Lunatick*, or somewhat *yet worse* than a *Lunatick*, consent to engage his Country again in such a *destructive*, and *all-consuming Measure*; and that at a Time, when she was *already sinking* under the *intolerable Pressure* of *Debts* and *Taxes*, occasioned by *useless Standing Armies*, *Raree-Shew Naval Armaments*, and *expensive, wretchedly conducted, and worse executed Expeditions*? No, it is very certain, no Man whose Heart was not altogether *Germanized*, and *steel'd* against the *Miseries* of his *Fellow-Subjects*, would have done this; and it is as certain, if there are not too many of the *same Kidney* in a certain Place, no Man will again *be suffer'd*, to do the same *with Impunity*; it is even to be hoped, what is past, is not altogether *forgotten* or *forgiven*.

One would wonder, but that we have lived to see Times, when we ought to wonder at nothing, what could be urged, by its vile *Partizans*, in favour of such a *destructive Measure*; but it seems they have found out, for the *poor*

*Creatures*

*Creatures* must say something, though they depend more upon *Numbers* than *Argument*, that unless we find the *French* full EMPLOYMENT by Land, they will soon invade us with such a superior Force, it will be impossible for us to resist them; which is just as true, as, to use a vulgar Expression, that the *Candle ate the Cat*: In Effect, it wou'd not be true, were even a *Bridge*, as broad and solid as that of *London*, laid over the *Narrow Seas*; it would not be true, were they *Masters* of all the *Ports* and *Shipping* in the *seven Provinces*; which we hope they never will, because, should they ever over-run them like a *Deluge*, as they were near doing in 1672, it would be our real *Interest* to receive them with open *Arms*; as we have Land more than enough to subsist them; and they need leave the Enemy only a *drowned Country*; which, unless we were yet more infatuated than we are at present, (and that is scarce possible) it wou'd never be in their Power to make habitable.

But supposing the *Dutch* wou'd sooner choose *Slavery* with them, than *Liberty* with us, and would assist them to subdue and enslave us; supposing all the Princes of *Germany* would stand by quietly, and see them possess themselves of all the *Netherlands*; which is very unlikely, even of the King of *Prussia* himself, whose Dominions border thereon; might not we, before any such Event could happen, by a right Management, destroy all the *Shipping* of *France* and

and Spain, and would they then be our Superiors at Sea, even with the Assistance of the Dutch?

Again, supposing them in Possession of all the Shipping, and Sailors of the three Nations, and that all were joined, and embark'd at Dunkirk, ready to invade us; provided we are an united People, which we shall soon be, if our real Interest is pursued; what would all the Forces, they could bring over, avail, against a People, who, if they were but tolerably disciplined, could oppose them in three Days, with above a hundred Thousand of the bravest Men in Europe? Who, if they received one Defeat, could easily recruit; and at the same Time, by their Navy, render it almost impracticable, for the Enemy either to recruit, or retreat.

Unless, therefore, the Gentlemen, who so often urge this Argument, believe we are quite abandoned by Providence, which, we confess, we have deserved but too much; and for which they may, perhaps, find some weighty Reasons, within the gloomy Recesses of their own Breasts; (and in that Case nothing can save us;) we cannot see any Cause for this, to our thinking, preposterous Fear of Invasions; and are, therefore, very apt to apprehend, the Danger of them is only insisted on, to cover some detestable Design, that will not bear the Light; and make us swallow some bitter Pill, that would not otherwise go down without absolute Compulsion. Of this Pretence, our Grand Vizier, lately de-

parted, to his own Place, frequently made an admirable Use ; whenever he wanted a Vote of Credit, an Augmentation of the Army or Navy, or any other Point of similar Importance ; and his worthy Successor, though no Man living could make a greater Jest of it, under his Predecessor, took Care to tread exactly in the same Steps, and for the same hopeful Ends.

That we are, at present, vastly superior to both the French and Spaniards, by Sea, is confess'd by all ; is it not therefore in our own Power, by a vigorous Prosecution of the War upon that Element, utterly to disable them from ever becoming our Rivals, by destroying all their Shipping, wherever we can find them ? Nay, is it not our Interest, if we were wise enough to see it ? Should we not have done it long ago, had we not been absolutely the Reverse, and quite infatuated ? By ruining their Commerce, ravaging their Colonies, and intercepting their Plate Fleets, which they would not be able to prevent, we should at once, render them incapable of carrying on the War ; put an End to their Breed of Sailors ; retrieve our own decay'd Trade, and enrich ourselves.

It is a commonly received Maxim, and, we believe, it will generally hold true, that a trading Nation ought always, if possible, to avoid a War ; and, more especially, a Rupture with Spain, was ever deem'd contrary, to the real Interest of these Kingdoms ; but, with Submission to wiser Heads, since the House of Bourbon,

*bon*, have not only got firm Possession of the Crowns of France and Spain, but there is the strictest Union between the two Courts; since, by our incomprehensible Policy, the Kingdom of the two Sicilies is now also vested in a Branch of that Family; since, they have now almost engross'd the Commerce to the Levant and Turkey, as well as Spain; since, by our Supineness and Neglect, and their own indefatigable Industry, they are not only become our Rivals, but have almost supplanted us in the Sugar Trade, to the inexpressible Detriment of our Colonies; since, by the Help of the Wool they purloin from us, they entirely supply Spain, and the West-Indies with Woollen Manufactures; since they have supplanted us likewise, in a great Measure, in the Guinea Trade; and have artfully and perfidiously worm'd us absolutely out of the Assiento; so that the Mines of Peru and Mexico yield their Treasures, not so much for the Spaniards themselves, as the French; and since, in a Time of Peace, by the Cambricks, Brandies, Teas, Wines, and Silks, which they constantly find the Means to run in upon us, they draw from us an immense Sum yearly in ready Money; since there is not the least Likelihood, that we shall ever regain our Trade to the South Seas, of which the French will soon be too firmly possess'd; since, we should regain but very little of our Spanish or American Trade, even though we were to have a Peace with Spain to morrow; whereas, on the contrary,

the French would carry on theirs *openly*, without *Interruption*, and in *full Security*, which at present they cannot ; since we should scarce recover that to the *Levant*, wherein they have already got too firm a *Footing* ; Thanks to our *senseless* and *wicked Introduction* of the Spanish *Trecks* into *Tuscany* ! Since, on the contrary, (as it is not to be supposed, Spain will ever make a Peace without France) we should lose more than we should get, by the *clandestine Trade* they would then carry on with us, for their *Cambricks*, *Silks*, *Brandies*, *Wines*, and *Teas*, they would run in upon us, and which is yet worse, by the *Wool* they would smuggle from us, as was before observed ; since this, we say, is the *real Case* between us, at present, however odd this Position may sound, in the Ears of *inconsiderate Persons*, we will venture to affirm, it is more the *true Interest* of these Kingdoms in general, and even the *MERCHANTS themselves*, (those who traded to Spain, and the South Seas excepted) that we should continue in a *State of War* with them, (so that War is carried on only by Sea) than in a *State of Peace*.

Nay, we will go yet farther ; and make no *Scruple* to assert, whilst the *Crowns* of France, Spain, and the Two Sicilies, continue *united*, as they are at present ; our *Commerce*, in General, will flourish more, under a vigorous and well-managed *Naval War* (if our A—y, V—ng and N—y Offices keep free from *Corruption* ; if

if *Cenvoys* are not DELAY'D, nor *Ships* to scour the *Channel*, and *Irish Seas* WANTING ; if *Stores* are timely provided ; if *Provisions* are wholesome ; and proper *Order* given, and intrusted with proper *Persons* ; if all these *Things*, we say, are duly and honestly observed, our *Commerce* will flourish more, we repeat it again, under a vigorous and well managed *Naval War*, than under any *Peace*, which should allow an open *Intercourse* with those two Nations.

The Reason of this is plain ; in such a War, we should gain more by our Captures from them, than we could, by what Trade we shou'd now carry on with *Spain* ; and as to that with *France*, we are much better without it, as the Balance has always been considerably against us, which, in that Case, must constantly be paid in Money. Again, by such a War, we should not only distress our natural *Enemy* to the last Degree, but, by ruining their *Commerce*, and destroying their *Colonies*, which they cou'd hardly prevent, whilst we are so much their Superiours by Sea, we shou'd, in a great Measure, retrieve our own, and make them flourish again as formerly. Nor would this be all ; for we should thereby, at the same Time, put it out of their Power, either to contend with us upon our own Element, or to think of invading us, with the least Prospect of Advantage to themselves : We should be able to keep their Men of War either useless, and block'd up in their Harbours, or, if they stirr'd out, we should

should take or destroy them ; and their *Breed of Sailors, Shipwrights, &c.* wou'd dwindle away by Degrees, till they wou'd be again reduced to the same weak Condition, they were in, before the Reign of *Lewis XIV.*

By a well-managed Descent upon their *Sugar Islands*, of which they are as tender as of the *Apple of their Eye*, we should at once ruin them, and promote the Welfare of our own for many Years. This might be done, by only destroying their *Ingenio's* or *Sugar-Works*, and carrying off their *Slaves*; which they cou'd scarce be able to hinder, nor, during a State of War, if we keep a good *Look-out*, cou'd ever be able to recruit. Besides, if we have a strict Eye upon the *Irish*, and prevent their supplying them with Provision; (which they frequently do, by pretending to be bound to our Colonies, and then sailing directly into such Latitudes where they are almost sure to fall into their Hands, and for which they never fail of being well paid;) we may go a great Way, towards starving them.

In Effect; it is notorious, were it not for our *Lumber*, and our *Provision*, the French *Sugar Islands* cou'd neither subsist, nor carry on their *Trade*; if therefore, we can but prevent the *Irish* from supplying them with the one, and our *Northern Colonies* from furnishing them with the other, we may effectually ruin them without striking a Stroke. It is likewise well known, that the *Spaniards* in the *West-Indies*, cannot

cannot *subsist* without divers European Commodities ; if, therefore, we can prevent, their being supply'd therewith from France or Spain, which by good Management, in a Time of War, we certainly may, they will of themselves carry on a *clandestine Trade* with *Jamaica*; which will be *more to our Profit*, than any *Trade*, they will *allow us* to carry on with them, in a Time of Peace.

Nor is even this all ; for, by a proper Use of *Gibraltar*, and *Port-Mahon*, with some farther Advantages, which, by a prudent Conduct, we may derive from thence, we might render their *Trade* to the *Mediterranean*, and the *Levant*, not only *precarious*, but *absolutely impracticable* : And by this Means, we should, at the same Time, in a great Measure, *retrieve* our *Turkey Trade*, now *almost lost*, besides preventing the *junction* of the *Brest*, and *Toulon* Squadrons.

Another Circumstance, which would probably follow from thence, and which may hereafter prove of great Moment, is, that, by the same Means, we may possibly lessen that Influence, our natural Enemies have had, of late Years, at the Porte ; since, if we ruin their *Turkey Trade*, which is entirely in our own Power, by having a strict Eye upon our Smugglers of *Wool* ; (for which Set, by the Bye, of unnatural and abandon'd Miscreants, no Punishment, not even Death itself is too bad ; as they contribute to the starving of thousands of their Fellow-subjects, and to the Ruin of their native

*Country*

*Country in general) and by keeping always a superior Squadron, of clean Ships, in the Mediterranean, to awe their Men of War, and intercept their Merchant-Men : since by these Means, we say, we put a Stop, in a great Measure, to their Levant and Turkey Trade, this will tend greatly, at the same Time, towards diminishing their Interest, and consequently their Influence at the Porte ; where it begins to grow very dangerous, and cannot be too narrowly watch'd, not only by us, but by the Queen of Hungary and the Czarina.*

To sum up briefly, what has been premised, since by one and the same prudent Measure, namely, a vigorous and well-managed Naval War, we should at once take the most likely and effectual Way, to restore the Balance of Power, and support her Hungarian Majesty ; (for both which we have lately PRETENDED so much Zeal;) as also to DISTRESS our natural Enemies ; RETRIEVE our drooping Commerce ; and PROVIDE for our own Security, against those terrible Bug-bears, call'd Invasions ; wherewith we have been so frequently alarm'd at every Turn, to serve, we fear, some sinister Purpose ; since, we repeat it once more, we should thereby retrieve our Levant, Turkey, and Sugar Trade, besides our Newfoundland Fishery ; of which, though not the least valuable, we have not mention'd a Word before ; since we should consequently, thereby, render our Manufactures at Home, and our Colonies Abroad flourishing ; since

since it would rather enrich than impoverish us, and, at the same Time, greatly weaken and almost beggar our Enemies; since, likewise, a *Land-War* produces directly contrary Effects, and both ruins and beggars us, without in the least hurting or weakening our Foes; since it is the very Measure, our most inveterate and implacable Adversaries, would wish to see us put in Practice; and, had they any Influence still over our Councils, which, we hope, they have not, would advise; what less can it be thought, than an almost-judicial Infatuation, to delay the one, or persist in the other, an Hour longer, than is absolutely unavoidable?

Since so many, then, and so great Advantages, must naturally, and almost necessarily, flow from one Tenor of Conduct; and Beggary, Slavery, Popery, Ruin, and Destruction, infallibly and inevitably result from the other, WHAT must we think of those Men, who would patronize and advise the latter, and neglect and disown the former, but that they are conceal'd Tr——rs; and actuated by Motives, entirely foreign, to the real Interest of Great-Britain! Should it be said, we aggravate Matters, in this State of the Case, we positively deny it; Beggary must as necessarily follow from a *Land War*, wherein we engage deeply, as inevitable Death from a long and violent Bloody-Flux; and for the same Reason: As the latter must infallibly drain us of our Life-Blood, whence Death necessarily ensues; so the former must

*unavoidably exhaust us* of our able bodied Men and Money, which are the *Vitals* of a Nation, and without which it can no longer subsist. Again, as *Beggary*, will disable us from defending ourselves, we must of Course fall a Prey, and become a Province to France ; whence *Popery* and *Slavery* undoubtedly follows ; which must soon terminate, in *Desolation, Ruin, and Destruction.*

Our Readers must surely be convinced, by this Time, that the *Motives*, which induced us to *engage so precipitately, inconsiderately, and deeply*, in the present *ruinous Land-War*, could not be of *British Growth*; it being big with nothing but *Misery* to this poor Nation; proceed we now to examine, from whence they *must* probably, have taken their Rise. We say, *probably*, because, from the very Nature of Things, it is scarce possible to arrive at *Certainty*; or, at least, so, as to extort a *Confession of Conviction* from those, who, however inwardly satisfy'd, of the *Truth* of what is *advanced*, will be so very *disingenuous*, not to acknowledge it, 'till compell'd thereto by *equal-to-mathematical Demonstration*. DARK DEEDS will always *shun the Light*; and the *Contrivers* of them, unless divested of common Understanding, or, harden'd in *Iniquity*, void of *Shame*, and arm'd with sufficient Power, not to fear Punishment, will shelter themselves behind so many *Pretences, Masks, and Disguises*; Nay, if found out by the *Discerning*, will actually *intrench*

trench themselves behind so many Skreens, and Subterfuges, that it will be utterly impracticable, to make their Guilt evidently appear, to the Satisfaction of all Men ; and especially of those, who being directly, or indirectly, concerned therein, will never own it, till undeniably prov'd.

Of this great Truth, we have lately had a glaring, and shocking Proof, in the Case of a Person newly departed to his own Place ; who, was manifestly in an open Conspiracy against the Liberties of his Country ; and, who, after having had the sole Management of the Treasury, as his Brother had of all our foreign Negotiations, for above Twenty Years, had the consummate Effronterie, to declare in open Senate, we cou'd not right ourselves by going to War, but must submit tamely, to all Manner of Insolences, Outrages, and Depredations, because, forsooth ! he had himself administered the Treasury, with such immaculate Integrity, that we had no longer any Money ; and his hopeful Brother, not to be behind hand with him, had conducted our Negotiations with such admirable Skill, profound Policy, and unerring Wisdom, that we had not one Ally left, who would join us.

We never pretended to be either great Politicians, or able Lawyers ; and yet we are fully satisfy'd, that this single shameless Declaration, of having brought the Kingdom into such a helpless, defenceless State, and consequently of having betray'd it to the Enemy, amounted to a

*positive Proof of the blackest of Treasons ; wou'd have been accordingly punish'd in any other Nation ; and would have hang'd any poor Rogue, even in this.*

If such a Man as this, could find the Means, to *skreen himself so effectually*, that not only no corporal Punishment should be inflicted on him, but that, (though he was given up on all Sides, by Friends as well as Enemies, even by his profesi'd Advocate, the profligate Author of Faction detected) he shou'd be suffer'd to dye in Peace, at least in his Bed, (for of his Peace we have some Doubt,) and even to enjoy unmolested, the Fruits of all his Rapine, Wickedness, and Corruption ; nay, not only so, but that the Publication of the Report of his Treasons, and Misdemeanours, should be prevented ; and if one could be found, after all this, sufficiently abandoned, to endeavour to canonize, and almost deify him ; as was done in the *Daily Advertiser*, of March 20 ; If such, we say, was the Case, and lately too, of such a Man, must not every one agree with us, that *Dark Deeds* will always *shun the Light* ; and that it is next to impossible, if the Offenders are of a certain Rank, to drag their *iniquitous Practices* so far into *open Day-Light*, as to render them *past Denial* by the obstinate ?

This being the Case, as was before observ'd, our Readers, we hope, will be satisfy'd with probable Demonstration ; and, if, as we have already shown, the Motives, to our engaging  
in

in a *Land War*, were not *British*, we likewise prove, this Conduct was neither for the *Interest* of the *Dutch*, the Queen of *Hungary*, nor the King of *Sardinia*, but that it was *undeniably* for the *Interest* of one particular, *inconsiderable*, *petty State alone*, and that this State was *H—r*, it will surely be allow'd, to amount to such probable *Demonstration*.

To begin, then, that it was neither by the *Advice*, nor for the *Interest* of the *Dutch*, cannot certainly be denied; since they not only refused to co-operate with us therein, but remonstrated strongly against it, as a desperate Measure that would infallibly draw down the *French Arms* into the *Netherlands*, and endanger their *Barrier*; wherein they were not at all deceived; and for which they do not at all thank us. In Effect, how much soever this our Conduct, may now contribute, towards forcing the *Dutch* into a *War*, (of which we are still in some *Doubt*, unless *France* persists in her *Incroachments*, and attacks some other of the *Barrier Towns*;) even in that Case, we are convinced, they will be glad to clap up a *Peace*, as soon as possible, upon reasonable *Terms*: and, if they can obtain the *Re-establishment* of their *Barrier*, by the *Restitution* of those Towns, it will be well, after all, if they do not follow our Example, at the End of the late *War*, and conclude a *separate Treaty*.

Thus much, we believe, suffices, to convince any considerate Person, not only that it

was

was neither by the *Advice*, nor for the *Interest* of the *Dutch*, that we *engaged*, with such *rash* and *desperate Precipitation*, in the present *ruinous Land-War*. We believe also, if we should at last, *drag them into it*, as they do a Bear to the Stake, it will not be *very safe*, to place too much *Dependance* upon them; because it is certain, they will be *glad to get out of it*, as soon as possible, that they may be at *Leisure*, to *watch the Motions* of the King of *Prussia*, of whom they have *some Jealousy*; and not without sufficient Cause; by Reason of his *Pretensions* to *Emden*, as Prince of *East-Friexland*, which give them *terrible Alarms*.

Now *Emden* is a Sea-port, which the *States* have long held in *Sequestration*, and where they have a strong *Garrison*; this they must either withdraw very soon, or come to a *Rupture* with his *Prussian Majesty*; both of which they would *willingly avoid*, and especially at this *Juncture*; because the *former* would be *infinitely dangerous*, even to the *very Being* of their *State*; and the *latter* *wou'd be greatly prejudicial* to their *East-India Trade*; of which, every one knows, they are *as jealous*, as the *most watchful Spaniard* of his *Mistress*.

It is, therefore very evident, *that*, upon all Accounts, the *Dutch* would have been *loth*, to *break with France* at this Time; and that they would have declined it, almost at any Price, in order to have a *strict Eye* upon that *enterprizing Prince*; who, they are afraid, "is the more

more desirous of *Embden*, because of its Convenience, for carrying on a Trade to the *East-Indies*, which, they believe, he has in View. It is as evident, likewise, for the same Reason, that they will accommodate Matters, as soon as possible with *France*; that they may have their *Hands at Liberty*, to oppose any Attempts of *Prussia* to their *Prejudice*; if they cannot terminate their Differences amicably with that Monarch.

Let us now examine, in the next Place, whether, notwithstanding all our *specious Pretences*, there is not great Reason to presume, we had as little Regard to the *Interest* of the Queen of *Hungary*, as we had to that of the *Dutch*, in our Conduct on this Occasion; and consequently, whether there is not sufficient Cause to imagine, we were *influenced by other Motives*, than we were *willing to acknowledge*, when we engaged in this *ruinous War*; what these Motives were, will be consider'd hereafter.

It has already been shown, at the Beginning, that this *pretended Zeal*, for the *Preservation* of the *Ballance of Power*, and *Support* of the Queen of *Hungary*, which now *flames out*, after so *extraordinary a Manner*, outrunning all *Discretion*, and *outweighing every other Consideration*, even that of the *very first Principle* in Nature, namely, *Self-Preservation*, is, not only of a *very new Date*, and, consequently, *greatly to be suspected*, but likewise *diametricall*

*cally contrary, to the whole Tenor of our Conduct, for these Twenty-five Years ; in short, that it is undoing, at one Stroke, what we had been so long industriously and indefatigably labouring to accomplish.*

Is it at all likely that we should be *heartily in earnest* in any such Design ? It would be *senseless* and *ridiculous* to believe it ; and we cannot help being *amazed*, that a Princess of so much *Wisdom*, and *Penetration*, as her *Hungarian Majesty*, should have suffer'd herself *so long*, to be the *Dupe of such Pretences* !

In Effect, is it not evident, that had we been really *in earnest*, to *support that Heroine*, we should have *fown immediately to her Assistance*, before all her *Veteran Troops* had been *cut off* ; and her *fairest and richest Provinces*, *over-run, ravaged, and almost depopulated* ? But now, to shew how *little Sincerity* there was in all our *seeming Zeal*, let us see how we did act.

When her *Hungarian Majesty's Dominions* were first invaded, by the King of *Prussia*, in *December 1740*, there were two *Ways* of being *serviceable* to that great, but *unfortunate Princess* ; One was, by *Mediating an Accommodation* between the *Two contending Powers*; and the other was, by a *timely and effectual Support*.

Of these two opposite Methods, the former was *infinitely the most eligible*, and certainly ought to have been *preferr'd by us*, upon all *Accounts* ;

*Accounts*; and, had we been *actuated* by any *Motives*, that had been either *truly British*, or *dictated*, by a *real Concern*, for the *Interest* of the Queen of *Hungary*, or even for the *Preservation* of the *Ballance of Power*, this *Method* would have been *approved of*, and follow'd. As it was not, this *one Circumstance alone*, amounts to a *convincing Proof*, to every one of *common Understanding*, to every one who does not *wilfully shut his Eyes* against the *Light*, that we never were *serious*, or *sincere*, in either of *these Pretences*.

What made the *former* of these *Methods* the *most eligible*, was, *first*, with *Respect* to *Europe in general*, whose *Peace* it would have *secured*; and that at the *slight Expence*, of *four Dutchies in Silesia*; to which his *Prussian Majesty* had an *indisputable Right*, and for which he offer'd a *very valuable Consideration*, though it might not, perhaps, amount to a *full Equivalent*: And yet, it is *much to be questioned*, all *Circumstances consider'd*, whether it was not *even more than a full Equivalent*.

However that be, this her *Hungarian Majesty* *MUST* have *comply'd* with, had we told her *plainly*, we *cou'd not assist her*, upon any *other Terms*; and, it is *certain*, this she would have *comply'd* with, had we desired it, and made it a *CONDITION*, *Sine qua non*, of our *supporting her at all*. It is *certain*, we say, she would have *comply'd* with *these Terms*, because, *at our Desire*, she afterwards agreed to *infi-*

nitely worse, by a *Cession* of the whole rich Province of *Silesia*, without *any Equivalent* whatever; after which, to shew how *punctually* we regard *Treaties*, any longer than they will serve a certain Turn, (*our own*, we DARE not, *our own*, we will not call it) we left her *infamously* in the *Lurch*.

It had been long expected, foreseen, and foretold, by all Europe, that, unless the *Grand Duke* of *Tuscany*, her Consort, was elected King of the *Romans*, before the *Decease*, of his Father-in-Law, the Emperor *Charles VI.* the *Disputes* about the *Austrian Succession*, would set all *Christendom* in a *Flame*: And, notwithstanding the *Pragmatick Sanction*, which was calculated, to settle it entire, upon the *female Line*, in Case of *Failure* of *Male Issue* in the House of *Austria*, was guaranteed by *Great Britain*, *France*, *Spain*, *Muscovy*, and the *Empire*, as a Body, together with the *Dutch* and *Denmark*, every one, of *Common Sense*, was very sensible, these Cobweb *Guarantees*, would be regarded but as *Cyphers*, by *France*, *Spain*, *Saxony*, or *Bavaria*; the *last* of which had never acceded thereto, and had *Pretensions*, not altogether without *Grounds*, (as had *Saxony* also, though she had renounced them *pro Tempore*, for a *present Advantage*) to a considerable Part thereof.

This, as was observed before, having been foretold, foreseen, and apprehended, by all Europe, is it not most amazing, when a new *Pretender* started

started up, whose *Pretensions* were far from groundless, and, it was plain, if not immediately satisfied, must serve for the Basis to a Confederacy, which would soon infallibly over-run all her Hungarian Majesty's Dominions ; is it not amazing, we say, when a new *Pretender* started up, and that one so powerful as the King of Prussia, that we should not advise the Way of Accommodation ; but should spur that Princess on, to repel Force by Force, and even offer to support her therein strenuously.

It was the real *Interest* of Great Britain, to bring Matters to an *amicable Issue*, between these two jarring Powers ; that the Queen of Hungary, having her *Hands at Liberty*, might be able to exert her whole Strength, if invaded, against France, and Bavaria ; which, however, in that Case, was not much to be apprehended, because his Prussian Majesty not only offer'd, upon the Cession, of even less, than what he claim'd as his Right, to advance a large Sum of Money, but to assist her with an Army of Twenty Thousand Men ; nay, in Case of Necessity, to support her with his whole Force ; and not only to become the chief Protector of her House, against all Pretenders, but to use his utmost Interest, to set the *Grand Duke* her Consort, upon the *Imperial Throne*.

His Prussian Majesty went even farther than all this ; for, to shew he was really in Earnest, (which it were to be wish'd, some others, who made a greater Bustle, had been,) and that his

*Actions* should be *conformable* to his *Words*, (though he had receiv'd a *pretty abrupt Answer*, to call it no worse, to his Proposals, from a *certain Court*;) upon having Intelligence, that the Elector of *Bavaria* intended, to invade the *Austrian* Dominions, he sent that Prince Notice, in a Letter, under his own Hand, that, unless he desisted from his Design, he shou'd be oppos'd by an Army, of Thirty-five Thousand *Prussians*, headed by himself in Person.

It was *visibly*, then, the *real Interest* of *Great Britain*, as was observ'd before, to bring Matters to an *amicable Issue*, between the King of *Prussia*, and Queen of *Hungary*; and that we did not do so, is *most astonishing*; especially when we consider, of *what Importance* these Offers were, to *secure* the *Tranquility* of *Germany*; and what *fatal Consequences*, the making an *Enemy* of his *Prussian* Majesty, at such a *delicate Juncture*, might be *attended* with, to *all Europe*; and this was yet the *more astonishing*, because there was no one so *short-sighted*, not to *foresee*, that *France* would *take Advantage*, of a *Rupture* between that Prince and her *Hungarian* Majesty, to *completat* the *long-desired Ruin* of the House of *Austria*; and because both *Spain* and *Bavaria*, had *actuallv* put in their respective Claims, to Part of the *late Emperor's Succession*, almost as soon as the Death of that Monarch was known.

Every one, therefore, foresaw, that a *War*, between these *Two jarring Powers*, must be followed

lowed with the most dangerous Effects to her Hungarian Majesty ; and that no one good Consequence could possibly ensue from thence ; whereas, on the contrary, the Prussian Monarch's Friendship at that ticklish Crisis was of the greatest Moment ; and was indeed the only Thing, cou'd save that unfortunate Princess, from imminent Destruction, and prevent all Europe's being set in a Flame. It was not only foreseen, but expressly foretold, that our acting any other Part, than that of Mediators, by declaring against Prussia, would, in all Probability, put the finishing Hand to her Ruin ; that it would throw his Prussian Majesty into the Arms of France, and draw a powerful Invasion, upon every Corner of her Dominions.

These pernicious, and even destructive Consequences, of such a preposterous Conduct, having not only been foreseen, but expressly foretold, will it not be read, with the utmost Astonishment, and Indignation, by after-Ages, that a P——t of G——t-Br——n, could be induced, and influenc'd, by any Motives whatever, to concur with so desperate a Measure ? Yet more, that they should be induced to do this, against a Prince, not only nearly allied in Blood to the present Royal Family, but who, cou'd he have made his Escape, without Detection, out of his Father's Dominions, had certainly married a Daughter of England ; who, even underwent Imprisonment on that very Account ; and, which is still more surprizing, who, in Case

of Failure of that Family, is *next Heir* to the *Crown of Great Britain*, and may possibly, tho' not probably, be one Day, *Sovereign* of these Kingdoms? That they should be *induced to do this*, we say, when it not only tended visibly, to involve us in a *consuming Land-War*, and to kindle a general Flame, throughout Christendom; but, when we were already engag'd in one by Sea, of which we had hitherto given but a very sorry Account; Nay, when we were groaning under a monstrous Debt, still unpaid, after above Twenty Years Peace, and were ready to sink every Hour, under the intolerable Decay of our Trade, and Load of our Taxes?

It is therefore, manifest, to every Man of Common Sense, that this pretended Zeal, on a sudden, for the Queen of Hungary, and the Balance of Power, was no more than a *Mask*, to cover some other, and, we fear, *sinister Design*; that, had we been in earnest in either, instead of endeavouring to widen, we should have used our utmost Efforts to heal, the *Breach* between her Majesty and the King of Prussia; and that, had we been sincere in our Professions, to support that heroic Princess, having once resolv'd upon that destructive Measure, we should, at all Events, as we had promised, have flown to her Assistance, at the Beginning, and before she was too much weaken'd, and impoverish'd; since this is no more, than we are now about to do, according to all Appearance, though there is no longer a Probability, or even a Possibility, without

without a *Miracle*, of our meeting with Success.

But, to render it *undeniable*, that in *our engaging* in *this Land-War*, we had *very little*, or *no Regard*, to the *real Interest* of the *Queen of Hungary*, (as, we have already shown, we had not either to *that of Great-Britain*, or the *States-General*) let us take a *curfory Review* of *our Conduct*, since *our embarking*, or rather *resolving to embark*, or, at least, to *seem to embark* therein. We had promised the *Queen of Hungary*, in the *most express Terms*, as was observ'd before, that we wou'd *support her AT ALL EVENTS*; and *declared*, that we look'd upon our assisting her in the War, wherein she was then engaged with *Prussia*, as a *Casus Fœderis*, in *Virtue* of our *Guarantee* of the *Pragmatick Sanction*; nay had actually taken Six Thousand *Danes*, and as many *Hessians* into our *Pay*, as was given out, for that Purpose.

But, how did we *perform* these *heroick Promises*, after *all this Expence and Military Parade*, when it came to the *Push*? Why truly, the Armies of *France*, and *Prussia*, put in their *Caveat* against *our acting*, by inclosing *H—r* between *two Fires*; which as *effectually disarm'd us*, as if all our Troops had been made *Prisoners of War*. *SUCH a Vis Inertiæ* has our *fatal Connexion*, with *any small State* on the *Continent*, upon *these Kingdoms*! *SUCH a dead Weight* did it then *prove*, to retard and frustrate all our *Operations*! And we will ven-

ture to prophesy, it will ever be same, as often as we have a War with any Prince, who, either by his own Troops, or those of his Allies, can find the Means to penetrate, and strike a Terror, into those Dominions.

We would, therefore, seriously advise THOSE, whom it may most Concern, to reflect maturely, upon this unfortunate Circumstance; and never to engage us, for the future, in Hostilities, with any such Potentates, till they have first effectually provided, for the Security of that favourite Spot, by Alliances or otherwise; since, if this is not done, it will always be in the Power of our Enemies, by only marching a strong Body of Troops thither, to render all our Efforts, and Expences, ABSOLUTELY USELESS; of which melancholy, and ungrateful Truth they are but too sensible, and well apprized. Let us ever remember MAILLEBOIS; and have so much Grace, to retain the Fear of him, always before our Eyes.

However, to return from whence we have digress'd, this was neither all, nor yet the worst Consequence, of our unhappy Connexion with that El—te; the Inactivity of the Danes and Hessians, after we had put ourselves to the great and useless Expence of hiring them, was bad enough in all Conscience; but, because the disarming us, upon the Continent, how fatal soever it might prove to the Queen of Hungary, was not a sufficient Price, for the Safety and Indemnity, of those too-well-beloved Territories,

ries, it was *stipulated*, to our eternal *Reproach*, that our *Fleet* in the *Mediterranean*, should continue as *inactive*, as our *Troops by Land*; and, though we had been some Years in a State of War with the *Spaniards*, that we should not *dare to molest* those our *profess'd Enemies*; but should *suffer them quietly to transport*, a *formidable Body of Forces* to *Italy*, to *over-run, ravage, and possess* themselves of, all the *Dominions*, the Queen of *Hungary* had yet remaining in those Parts.

Such was the *mighty Assistance*, we gave that *unfortunate Princess*, in the *Height* of her *Distress*, after our *repeated Promises* to *support her at ALL EVENTS!* But let us, for *Shame*, draw a *Veil*, over a *Transaction so dishonourable* to these Kingdoms in general; and *so derogatory* from the *antient Glory* of the *British Name*.

Having got out of this *ugly Scrape*, at the *Expence* of our *Honour* and *Treasure*, into which it had been brought by its own *infatiable Avarice*, and the *unexpected Discovery* of its *iniquitous Schemes*, the *El-te*, though *partly disappointed* of its *Views*, was resolved to contrive some Way to *lick itself whole*: It had been put to the Charge of augmenting its Forces with Six thousand Men, in Hopes of being *reimbursed* by the *Spoils*, of its *Prussian Neighbour*; but this *laudable Design* being *prevented* and *detected*, by the Queen of *Hungary*, and the *Czarinâ's*, refusing to concur therein; and the Ta-

bles being turn'd upon itself, by the March of *Maillebois*, and the *Prussian Forces*, towards its Frontiers; some other Method was to be thought of, for the *Pay* and *Subsistence* of these now *useless Troops*; as also, to defray the Expence, it had been at for *Levy-money*, and other *Military Preparations*.

It was well known, all these could not be obtained, from any other State, than *Great Britain*; which had, often before, been made to sacrifice her own *Interest*, to the Views of that *worthless Darling*; and it was necessary to find out some *colourable Pretence*, for loading the Nation with so *odious a Burthen*, before it could be supposed, as much *Dupes* of *H—r* as we had hitherto been, that this would be consented to even by *us*; and for this, none could be devised more *specious*, than to cover it over with the old Mask, of an *extraordinary Zeal* for the *Ballance of Power*, and *Re-establishment* of the Affairs, of the Queen of *Hungary*.

Well then, upon this *stale Pretence*, we were induced to *saddle ourselves*, with the *intolerable Load*, of Sixteen Thousand *H—ns*; though it had been *plainly seen*, just before, when we left that *Heroine* so basely in the *Lurch*, and abandoned her both by *Sea* and *Land*, how little all our mighty *Professions* were to be trusted; and it was well known, how little they would be *regarded*, should the *El—te*, come a second Time into *Danger*; nay, though it was as well known, these *Troops* durst not *act offensively*,

sively, in those Places where there they might be of *most Service* to that Princess, for fear of having their Prince put to the *Ban of the Empire*.

This Difficulty being now got over, and these Forces taken into the *British Pay*, let us proceed to observe, how *vigorously* we went on ; and what *mighty Feats* we performed, for the Service of that Princess. *First*, they were taken into our Service, full six Months before they could be of any Manner of Use ; and *secondly*, they were ordered to a Place, where it was apparent they could be of *no Benefit* ; instead of being sent after *Maillebois*, to *barrass* him in his Rear ; and *prevent* his *disengaging* his Countrymen, who were coop'd up in *Prague*, and must otherwise have been either *all cut off*, or *made Prisoners at Discretion*.

This would certainly have been done, had *our Zeal* for the *Queen of Hungary*, been as *real* as was *pretended* ; and it was the *most effectual Service* could have been rendered her ; but it was *very evident*, by our *contrary Conduct*, that all that was intended was, to *indemnify H—r* for her *past Expences*, and *PRESERVE* her *worthless Troops* from *Danger*.

This was yet *more manifest*, the *following Campaign* ; when, though the *Enemy unexpectedly attack'd us at Dettingen*, whereas it was *very apparent*, we never intended to attack them ; and tho', by the *innate Bravery* of our *National Troops*, we *vigorously repulsed* them, and might have gained

*an entire Victory ; which, at that critical Juncture, might have put an End to the War, at one Blow ; our worthless Mercenaries REFUSED to join us ; our own Men were call'd off from the Pursuit ; and the French suffer'd quietly to repass the River Mayne, contrary to all the Rules of War, and sound Policy ; when, having gain'd this Advantage, or rather, to call it more properly, having had this lucky Escape, we made a precipitate Retreat, and even abandoned our own sick and wounded to the Mercy of a defeated, and flying Enemy ; when, after this, we never struck, nor attempted to strike another Stroke ; and when, to crown all, we refused to join Prince Charles, pass the Rhine, and carry the War into the Enemy's Country ; though we had before boasted what Conquests we wou'd make, in Alsace, and Lorrain ; and how low we would reduce the French.*

Again, had our Zeal for the two Points before mentioned, been as sincere, as it was counterfeit and delusive, should we, (after having found, by woful Experience, of what dreadful Consequence the King of Prussia's Enmity, and of what great Value his Friendship might be,) have haughtily rejected all the Offers of Peace, made by him, when our Troops were at Hanau ; though it was evidently the Interest of all Europe, but France and Spain, to put an End to the War in Germany ; though his Prussian Majesty had expressly declared, he would look on all

all *foreign Troops*, that should enter the Empire, as *Enemies*, and accordingly endeavour to *repel them*; and though it does not appear, her *Hungarian Majesty* herself, was *averse* to an *Agreement*, upon *those Terms*. What cou'd possibly be the Reason, of such *unaccountable Conduct*, so *directly contrary* to the *Interest* of *Great Britain*; but that the *H—r Troops* wou'd then have been of no *farther Service*, and must have been *sent back* into *their own Country*?

Come we now to the next, (would it might be *the last!*) ever *memorable Campaign*; where it will be again *plain seen*, *how much*, or rather *how little*, we had these two pretended Points at Heart. After the *timely Grant*, of *far greater Supplies*, than had ever before been agreed to, since the Settlement of the Crown of this Kingdom upon one single Person, that is, since the *Abolition* of the *Saxon Heptarchy*, our Army, so late in the Year, as the latter End of *July*, did not amount to above fifty thousand Men; so that, to the *eternal Scandal* and *Dishonour* of the *British Name*, instead of *daring to face* the Enemy, they were obliged for their *own Safety*, to *intrench themselves* up to the *very Nose*; and *ignominiously skulk'd* behind *those Safe-guards*, whilst the *haughty Gaul* was *suffer'd* to go on *quietly*, reducing one Fortress after another, in their *very Sight*.

But even this is not all; into such a *pretty Plunge* had we brought ourselves, by our *hopeful Counsels*, together with our *unaccountable Neglect*,

or the wicked *Imbezzlement* of the Sums granted, that, had not Prince *Charles of Lorrain*, by *gloriously forcing* a Passage over the *Rhine*, at the Expence to us of 150,000*l.* disengaged our *Handful of Men*, from the *imminent Danger* to which they were exposed, (being almost surrounded by three great Armies, *flush'd with Victory*,) they must either have been every one *cut in Pieces*, or compell'd to *surrender* themselves *Prisoners* at *Discretion*. Was this a likely Way to *reduce FRANCE*, *restore* the *Balance of Power*, or *support* the *Queen of Hungary*; the *only Pretences* for our engaging in this *ruinous Land-War*?

On the contrary, is it not as plain, from this *very single Step*, as that *the Sun shines at Noon, on a bright Day*, that these were merely *Pretences*, to cover *some other Design*? In Effect, instead of the *extraordinary Zeal* for that Princess, which *lately flam'd out* in *so violent a Manner*, that all our own *most important Concerns* were to be *utterly disregarded, neglected, and postponed*, for that *one Consideration*; instead of this, we say, had we had but the *least real Value or Concern* for her in the World; nay, had we had but the *least Compassion*, or even *common Humanity*; should we have *peremptorily insisted* upon the Prince's Passage of that River; when we were not only *sensible*, at the same Time, he must thereby leave *all Germany exposed*, to the *Machinations* of her *in-veterate and barbarous Enemies*; but were even then apprized of the *Frankfort Alliance*,

to

to attack her Dominions, on every Side, with more Fury, and Inhumanity, than ever ?

It is evident, then, we say, once more, from this *single notorious and shameful Transaction*, that there was not the least *Truth*, in any of these *specious Pretences*; but that, on the contrary, there was *some other clandestine Design, some other secret unwarrantable Views*, at the Bottom: And, as we have already *proved*, it was neither for the *Interest* of Great Britain, the Dutch, or the Queen of Hungary, that we *embark'd in this ruinous War*; as we shall *presently shew*, it was not for the *Advantage* of his Sardinian Majesty; as it was foretold; on the contrary, and we have found it so, by *woful Experience*, that it would be *quite the Reverse*; notwithstanding which, we have hitherto *rashly*, and *wickedly persisted* in so *destructive a Measure*; it follows *necessarily*, and of *Consequence*, that it was for the Benefit of H—r; since, it is *manifest*, that Country has already been a *considerable Gainer* thereby; and it is *as manifest*, no other except the *Dominions* of our *Enemies*, (amongst whom we include Prussia, and Bavaria, because, at present, they are so *indirectly*,) *has, or can derive, any Advantage* from thence.

Let us now proceed to examine, whether such a Step, could be for the *Interest* of the King of Sardinia; though, we think, it is so evident, *it could not*, that it is almost *Loss of Time*, to go about to prove it; and, indeed,

we

we should not give ourselves the *least Trouble*, about any Thing *so incontestable*, but that *some celebrated Speech-makers*, have made *late notable Discoveries*, not *obvious* to any *Man out of Place*; namely, that we, thereby, made the *French incapable*, of sending a Body of their *Troops*, to join the *Spaniards* against him : A *formidable Diversion* truly, and really *some of our Diversions* have been *so admirably advised*, and *so finely put in Execution*, that were not the Subject *too melancholy* to be *jested with*, they would indeed *highly divert us*, in a *literal Sense*; as, to our *eternal Shame* be it spoken, *they did, our profess'd Enemies, the French*, in the Army of the Count de Saxe, *last Campaign*; when, they had even a *Company of Comedians* from Paris, to act a Play at our Expence; and when we were *so stupid, so cowardly, or so traiterous*, not to find them *better Employment*. As we would not willingly be thought to aggravate Matters, and should likewise be very loth to incur the Ill-Will of our Superiors, we shall give the Account of this *scandalous Affair*, Word for Word, as it is in the *Gentleman's Magazine* for last September, page 501. under the Article of *Flanders*.

“ The Army of the *ALLIES*, *not being able*  
 “ *to undertake any Thing*, but having *lost se-*  
 “ *veral Parties*, and about 1500 *Horses*, and  
 “ *beginning to be under Difficulties*, for want  
 “ *of Forage*, broke up on the 17th O. S. from  
 “ *Chateau d'Austin, St. Guin, &c.* in order to  
 “ return

" return to their strong Camp, by the Scheld,  
 " and thence into Winter Quarters, having  
 " sent their heavy Baggage to Ghent. But,  
 " as the Count de Saxe, had been reinforced  
 " by 30,000 Men, it was conjectured, that he  
 " would not let slip the Advantage, to be made  
 " of the Superiority of his Forces, though the  
 " Allies did; especially as his Troops have  
 " been flush'd with Success in several Skir-  
 " mishes, and are daily spirited up, and di-  
 " verted, at the Expence of the Allies, and  
 " of the ENGLISH in particular, by a Com-  
 " pany of Comedians from Paris.—These Peo-  
 " ple perform a humorous Play, where *Har-*  
 " *lequin*, in Scene I. represents an *English* Of-  
 " ficer, whom *Scaramouch* asks, where he is  
 " going? To the Siege of *Lisle* (answers he,)  
 " which we shall take in Five Days. SCAR.  
 " You have not a sufficient Force. HARL.  
 " Don't mind that,—One *Englishman* will  
 " beat Five *French*, Huzza, Boys! SCAR.  
 " But where is your Artillery? HARL. Odd  
 " so! (*scratching his Head*) we have forgot  
 " it.—Let me think—it is at *Oijend*, or *Ant-*  
 " *werp*, if it has escaped the late Storm.—In  
 " the succeeding Scenes, *Harlequin* comes in  
 " with both his Arms, and one Leg off, but de-  
 " clares, he still rises to Preferment. SCAR.  
 " Asks him, in Scene 4, What are you now?  
 " HARL. I have the Pleasure to see myself a  
 " Lieutenant General,—but must lament one  
 " Thing, the *French Dogs*, whom we have

" beaten, have run away with all our Horses.  
 " SCAR. Very strange, indeed ! supply your-  
 " selves from the *D—b*, and *H—ns*, for  
 " they dare not use them. — In the last Scene,  
 " Harlequin comes in without a Head. SCAR.  
 " What do you call yourself now, *Monsieur* ?  
 " HARL. I am General of the — SCAR.  
 " True, *Monsieur Harlequin*, you have Two  
 " Wooden Arms, and one Wooden Leg, but you  
 " must have another Qualification yet, that is,  
 " a WOODEN-HEAD ?"

We have chosen, to make this Quotation, *verbatim*, from the before mention'd Magazine, because the Proprietor is known to have a Place under the Government ; consequently, cannot be suspected of Disaffection ; and all the Remarks, we shall make thereon, are ; *First*, that if any one can *read this Passage*, without the *utmost Indignation*, he must not have *one Drop of true British-Blood* in his Veins ; and *Secondly*, if any one can behold us *persisting* in the same *destructive Course*, without the *greatest Anxiety*, and *Concern*, he must be *utterly divested of all Love, and Bowels*, for his *bleeding Country*. Does it not follow, then, a *fortiori*, that, if any one (either to *curry Favour* with those in Power, or for any other *sinister Views*,) can *advise*, or *concur* in *supporting*, such *desperate Measures*, he must be *yet more void*, of any *natural Affection* for his *Mother-Country*, and must even be a *downright Parricide* ?

But

But, begging Pardon for this Digression, let us now see, of what Advantage, our embarking in a LAND-WAR, has been, or can, with the least Probability, be expected to be, to the King of Sardinia. We never cou'd yet hear, any other Plea urged, by the most zealous and artful Advocates for this ruinous Conduct, than that, by our finding the French Employment in Flanders, we should disable them from sending a Body of Forces, to the Assistance of the Spaniards on the Side of Piedmont, and Savoy; or, in other Words, should make a formidable Diversion in his Favour.

How well-grounded this Assertion was, his Sardinian Majesty has already found, by woful Experience; and may, in all likelihood, again prove, by yet more fatal Consequences, next Campaign. But, be that as it will, let us now examine, not only how formidable this Diversion was, but how formidable it may, probably, be for the future, whilst Things are as they are.

That it was indeed a Diversion, we have already seen; but it was in Favour of our Enemies, whom it greatly diverted, at the Expence of our Honour, and Treasure; for which very Reason, none, but our most inveterate Foes, will ever desire to see it prove such another.

But, will the most barden'd in Iniquity, the most corrupt Adopter of every ministerial Measure, DARE TO SAY, this Diversion, which has been such a Diversion, to every one, but

OURSELVES and our ALLIES, disabled the French from supporting the Spaniards, with a Force superior to that of the King of Sardinia ? Will the most harden'd say, that, had it not been for the glorious, and beyond-Expectation-obstinate Defence of Coni, they had not been in Possession, of the greatest Part of that Prince's Dominions, last Year ; and that they would not have open'd this Campaign, with the Siege of Turin, his Capital ; if he had not rather chosen, to compromise Matters, by coming to an Agreement, on their Terms, and changing-Sides ?

Again, is it not now well known, by every considerate Person, that neither our Army, nor our Fleet, DARE either effectually assist ourselves or our Allies, if H——r puts in a Caveat, as she surely would, if again invaded ; and that this would put an effectual Stop to all our Operations ; and make us forego all our Advantages, though in the West-Indies ? Is it now a Secret, that a C——pt and all C——pting M——y, have before now been able to carry all before them, and not only to get any Bill pass'd, but to obtain the Sanction of a M——ty in P——t, to any Measures they pleased, though ever so ruinous ? And ought we not always to be apprehensive, that, what has been, may be again ? Is it not well known, that, had not the Fear, of the Safety of H——r, ty'd our Hands, and militated powerfully for the Security of Naples, the Queen of Hungary, by the Means of our Fleet, had now been in Possession of the Crown of the

*Two Sicilies*; and might then have given such effectual Assistance, to the King of Sardinia, as must soon have driven both French and Spaniards, out of Italy? Is it not now as well known, that by the soon-expected Function of the Genoese; which is owing to a fatal and every Way unjust Article in the Treaty of Worms, the Affairs of Italy are in a Situation wholly desperate? Is it not known, that this is altogether owing to the *H—r* Neutrality?

Would there be any End of our Questions, were we to go on, in our Examination of Blunder after Blunder, (to call them no worse) into which, our fatal Connexion, with those worthless Territories has drawn us? Was not our falling upon the Spaniards, in 1718, in the Mediterranean, to which all our subsequent Differences with that Nation, and all their Outrages and Depredations were entirely owing, occasioned solely, by the Want of the Investiture of Bremen and Verden, from the then Emperor? And was not our clapping up a seperate Peace with them afterwards, upon the most dishonourable Terms, even the Promise of restoring GIBRALTAR, caused by the Obstruction, then given to the Views of the Court of *H—r* upon Mecklembourg, by his Imperial Majesty? Were not all our Baltick Expeditions, calculated only to secure the Safety, of the Dutchies abovemention'd? Were not the fatal Treaties, of *H—r*, and Seville, entirely owing to our Resentment, against the same

Prince,

Prince, for traversing the Views of that *El-te* upon the Territories before specify'd ; which lay very conveniently for the long-desired Arrondissement of her Dominions ? Was not our impolitick and shameful Desertion of that Prince, in 1734, contrary to our express Engagements; not many Years before, when we became Guarantees of the Pragmatick Sanction, altogether owing to the same Motives? And is not the present ruinous Land-War the hopeful Product of our Inaction at that Time?

After all this, no Man surely can deny, that it is rightly named, when it is call'd a *H—r War*; neither, if we persist therein much longer, after seeing what blessed Consequences it has had already, can it well be ascribed to any other Cause. In short, after all our boasting of conquering ALSACE, and recovering LORRAIN, after all our prodigious Expences already incur'd, what is the Sum Total, of our mighty Feats, in this so-much-cry'd-up, and so-eagerly-prosecuted Undertaking?

Ask the Dutch, and they will tell us ; the Loss of great Part of their Barrier ; and endangering the Rest. Ask the Queen of Hungary, she will answer ; the Giving up all Silesia ; the Ravaging and depopulating Bohemia a second Time ; the exposing it to the same Hazard, a third ; and to crown all, the drawing down the French Arms upon the Netherlands, and risquing the Loss, of all her Possessions in those Countries, which were before in no Danger ; besides a Probability,

*Probability, of Tuscany, and all her Italian Dominions, meeting with the same Fate ; by the soon-expected Function of the Genoese ; and our Fleet not daring, last Year, to assist Prince Lobbowitz effectually, for Fear Saxony should make Reprizals upon that Darling, the helpless El—te ; though it had been the Original Cause of all these Calamities ; and consequently, deserv'd most, in common Justice, to suffer.*

But, shall we go yet farther, and ask the King of Sardinia, of what Advantage this formidable Diversion, so-much-extoll'd, in Flanders, has been to his Majesty. Might he not reply, with great Truth and Justice, demand it of my lost Savoy, and my other desolate Dominions ; demand it of my reduced Fortresses, and ruined Subjects ; or, if that is not sufficient, demand it of the trembling Inhabitants, of my Capital, Turin ; who expect to be besieged therein, before the End of the approaching Campaign. Might he not also justly add, that all these Disasters, might have been prevented, had our Fleet and Army EXERTED THEMSELVES last Summer, as was expected, after all our mighty Promises, and Boastings. Such have been the blessed Fruits, Such the mighty Feats we have perform'd, in a War, wherein we engag'd only through H——r Views, Ambition, and Avarice ; and wherein, nevertheless, all our Efforts, have been render'd ineffectual, by the Obstructions raised by H——r alone.

In Effect, it is now no News any where, that,

that, on the Rupture between the King of *Prussia*, and Queen of *Hungary*, we were induced to act as *Parties* against the former, rather than as *Mediators* between them, and *common Friends* to both, in Compliance with the *selfish Views* of *H—r*; which were to *fish in troubled Waters*, and lay hold of that Opportunity, to seize on some of the *Prussian* Dominions; for which *very righteous Purpose*, that Court had *increased their Troops* with 7 or 8000 Men.

*These Views* being *frustrated*, by the King of *Prussia's* throwing himself into the Arms of *France*, (to which Extremity *our rash Measures* had reduced him, as it was foretold they would,) there remained no other Remedy, but either to *disband those Troops*, now become *useless*, (in which Case the *Levy-Money*, and other Ex-pences, incur'd upon that Head, wou'd have been altogether lost,) or, by *some plausible Pretence*, to *prevail on us*, (the well-known *Bubbles* of all *Europe*,) to take them into *our Service*. SERVICE did we say? we mean *into our Pay*, for Service they *never* did us *any*; on the contrary, by the Preference given to them in every Respect, they rather appear'd as *our Masters*, and we as *their Drudges*; intitled to nothing, but to take *what Quarters* they pleased to leave us, and *what Provision* we could find, after they were *gorg'd*.

To return, however, from whence we have digress'd, the *most specious Pretence*, that cou'd be

be devised, for this Purpose, was to involve us in a *Land-War*, at first, as *Auxiliaries* to the Queen of *Hungary*; after which, it was easily foreseen, we shou'd soon become *Principals*; and then, it was presum'd, those Troops wou'd, of Course, be *saddled upon us* for *some Years*.

This *hopeful Scheme*, then, to enable *H—r* to *lick herself whole*, at our Cost, was the *real Motive* to our engaging in this *ruinous War*; though *colour'd over* with a *pretended Zeal* for her *Hungarian Majesty*, and the *Balance of Power*; and this it was, prevented our *becoming Mediators* between the *contending Parties*, as in *sound Policy*, and even in *Consideration of the Tyes of Blood*, we were otherwise oblig'd to have done. This we should have done, had we been *actuated by Motives entirely British*; and had we acted *thus prudently*, as almost *any other People*, in the like Circumstances, *but ourselves*, wou'd, by securing the King of *Prussia in our Interest*, we should, in all Probability, not only have *prevented the Effusion*, of so much *Christian Blood*, (of which we have now been *indirectly*, if not *directly*, the Occasion) but, we should also have hindered, the *breaking out* of the *War in Germany*, and *all the Calamities* that have thence ensued.

Had his *Prussian Majesty's first Offers to our Court* been accepted, (and *no one good Reason* can be given, why they were not;) *France* would never have offer'd to *support the Pretensions of Bavaria*; as knowing too well, how

dearly all her Attempts, to carry the War into the Heart of Germany, have always hitherto cost her ; neither, indeed, would the late Emperor himself, have dared disturb the Peace of the Empire, had he been assured, of thereby drawing the Arms of Prussia upon himself ; and exposing his own Dominions, to Ruin and Desolation.

But, if all that has been premised, were not sufficient, to convince every reasonable and impartial Person, that we were not induced, to engage in this destructive War, through any Views of deriving an Advantage thence, either to ourselves ; to Europe in general ; or to our Allies in particular ; (at least,) unless something could likewise be thereby hook'd in, for the dear H—rt ; our after-Conduct would render it evident, almost beyond Denial ; and that, for Two substantial Reasons : First, because it would, otherwise, be wholly unaccountable ; and, Secondly, because, supposing the Benefit of those Possessions, to have been always primarily consulted, it will be very easy to account, for every Step we took afterwards.

Sixteen Thousand H—ns being once taken into our Pay, it became MANIFESTLY our Interest to push on the War, with Vigour, and strike some decisive Stroke ; in Order to put an End thereto as soon as possible, and even, if an Opportunity offer'd, at one Blow ; it became likewise as MANIFESTLY the Interest of H—r, (unless she cou'd obtain something more

more, or, at least, equally advantagious, some *Arrondissement* to her Territories, by a Treaty) to make only an *empty Parade* of Action, but to *protract*, and *spin out* the War, as long as was practicable; in Order to keep so large a *Body*, of their *worthless Forces*, so much the longer *in our Pay*: Now, let us proceed, to examine how we did act; whether for the *Advantage* of G—t B—n, and her *Allies*, or of the El—te; and let this be the *Test*, or *Touchstone*, to try whether the *Pretences*, that were *trumpt up*, on a sudden, to precipitate us into this *ruinous Land-War*, were really *Sterling*, or *base Metal*.

The taking these Troops *into our Pay*, full *Six Months* sooner than we could possibly have *Occasion* for them, is, of itself sufficient, to convince any one, *not wilfully blind*, whose *Advantage* was *primarily consulted*; but, not to *insist* too much upon this, (though it wou'd *puzzle*, we fear, some of our *wisest Heads*, to account for it satisfactorily) let us see how we behav'd the Summer following. Why, truly, after best Part of the Season for Action was spent in *useless Marches*, and *Counter-marches*, without *any Design*, as was apparent by the *Sequel*, of coming to an *Engagement*, we had brought our Troops into such a *fine Scrape*, that, in all Probability, they had no other Remedy, but to *flare*, be *cut in Pieces*, or *surrender at Discretion*.

FORTUNATELY for us, the Count de Gra-

mont's *Courage* got the better of his *Conduct*; and, upon his *rashly* beginning to *attack us*, by the innate *Bravery* of our *national Forces*, he not only receiv'd a *severe Repulse*, as was observed before, but, had we *followed our Blow*, as by all the *Rules of War*, and *sound Policy*, we *certainly ought*, the *flying Enemy*, whom we had *driven back* almost to the *River*, must have been *precipitated therein*; the *Result* of which could not fail to have been a *total Defeat*; perhaps, *almost as signal*, and as *decisive too*, as that at *Hochstet*.

But this did not agree with the *Views* of *H-r*, as it might have *put an End* to the *War* too soon; and her *Troops enter'd into our Pay*, not to *fight*, but to *eat*; accordingly, they not only *refus'd to concur with us* in the *Battle*, but even to join in the *Pursuit*; and, lest the *Resolution* of our *national Troops*, should of itself be *sufficient*, to *finish the Work*, they were call'd off, and a *Stop was put* to all *farther Action*, for that Day: And, what *never happened before*, nor can be *parallell'd* in all History, the *Fectors make a precipitate Retreat* from a *conquer'd Foe*, leaving their *sick and wounded* at *their Mercy*; as if, (like the Man, who, having rid over a *single Plank*, laid over Part of *the Chester-Bridge*, then *broken down*, one dark Night, dropt down Dead, next Day, on seeing how narrowly he had escaped,) they had been seiz'd with a *panick Fright*, at the *Remembrance* of their own *Deliverance*.

After

- After this blessed Effect of H—r Counsels, and H—r Cowardice, or Treachery, being still apprehensive, lest too speedy an End should be put to the War, it was thought proper, to persist in the same Course of Inactivity; we declined to join Prince Charles, and concluded the Campaign, without offering to strike another Stroke, though we had boasted what Conquests we would make, in Alsace and Lorraine. Nor is this any Wonder; we had shewn the French we were still the same Britons, who had so often beaten them, in Queen Anne's Reign; which might probably induce them to propose some Terms of Accommodation; in which Case, it was hoped, by the Means of their Influence over the Emperor, some advantagious Conditions, such as the Secularization of a rich Bishoprick, or Disfranchisement of some free Cities, in order to being annex'd to the El—te, might have been obtained; after which, we should have found our M—r as pliable, and forward, to clap up a Peace; as, we are expressly told in the Prussian Manifesto, he was the Reverse: And, that this is the right Key, to our Conduct at that Juncture, is evident, because we defy any one to account for it otherwise.

This hopeful Scheme, however, being defeated, by France not proving so tractable as was wish'd; and our insolent, and useless Mercenaries, being to be kept in Pay at all Events: MIGHTY PREPARATIONS were to be made, or rather, immense Supplies were to be given, for acting with Vigour the ensuing Campaign; and, because the well-known Backwardness of the Dutch to concur with us, (which every one was sensible, must disable us from acting,) might prevent their being granted readily; and be urged as an irrefragable Argument, to promote an Agreement between the Imperial Court and that of Vienna; we were to be cajoled with Assurances, evidently false, that they were disposed to join us heartily; Nay, rather than fail, we were to draw down the French Arms upon their Barrier, to the endangering the Loss of all the Netherlands, in order to force them into our desperate Measures.

This Objection being removed, by the Help of this false Assertion, in the Face of P—t, and SUMS, vastly exceeding, all that had ever been known before, timely, and chearfully granted, how did we behave then? To use the Words of a Great and Good Man, on another melancholy Occa-

*Occasion, our Enemies will tell the Rest with Pleasure.—Instead of meeting the French with an Army, capable of making Head against them, we became the inglorious Spectators of their rapid Conquests ; only amused our own People and our Allies, with an empty Parade ; and to shew the Sincerity, of our dissembled Zeal for the Queen of Hungary, and the Balance of Power, were glad to compound for our own Safety, at the Price, as was before observed, of 150,000 l. and sacrificing all her German Territories to the Mercy of her inveterate Enemies.*

Thus have we prov'd, we hope, undeniably, that the present ruinous Land-War, is, to all Intents and Purposes, a *H—r War* ; was begun altogether upon *H—r Views* ; and has been prosecuted, (if indeed it can be said to have been prosecuted AT ALL) in a Manner entirely subservient, to the Interest of that *El—te* ; without the least Regard to that of *G—t B—n*, or any of her Allies whatever, when once they interferred with the Safety, or Advantage, of these Dominions.

### P O S T S C R I P T.

**T**HIS Pamphlet was advertised so long ago, as towards the End of last November ; but, on the Prospect of an approaching Change of the *M—y*, and the *Hopes*, that it would be followed by a *Change*, not only of *Men*, but, (as was promised by our former JEHU, as well as his Successors, and will always be, by artful and designing Men) by another, and better, of *Measures*, it was laid aside for that Time. It was then intended to be addressed, to a Member of the old Ministerial Faction ; but there having been another since, providentially defeated, who have all united with the others, in a Body, as one common Band of *M—rc—s* ; (which is no more than what was natural, since in Support of the same laudable *Views*, and *Schemes*, and for the same disinterested *Ends*;) it was thought proper to throw it into another Form, and publish it now ; since according to all Appearance hitherto, it may be equally seasonable at present ; and may serve to open the Eyes of all, who are not absolutely determined to keep them shut, till they fall into INEVITABLE BEGGARY, and consequently, RUIN, and SLAVERY.







